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INTRODUCTION
Roughly an hour before his attempted assassination of then-President
Ronald Reagan on March 30, 1981, John Hinckley Jr. wrote a letter to Jodie
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Foster.1 In it, he detailed his assassination plan, dedicating it solely to the actress.2 He then left his room at the Washington Hilton Hotel and fired six shots
at the President.3 With the country watching closely, Hinckley’s trial and subsequent “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI) verdict marked a distinct period
of reform regarding the so-called “insanity” defense and the relationship between
mental health and the law.4
By all accounts, Hinckley had a fairly normal childhood, born to a middleclass family in Oklahoma.5 His fascination and obsession with Jodie Foster did
not start until 1976, during a viewing of the film Taxi Driver in which Foster
plays a child prostitute.6 In 1980, Hinckley followed her to New Haven, Connecticut, where Foster was attending Yale University.7 He tried to communicate
with her by phone and littered her dorm mailbox with love letters.8 His pursuit
of Foster would prove to be unsuccessful, and he ultimately left New Haven with
little acknowledgement from the actress.9
Hinckley’s troubles did not end after his departure from Connecticut. Later
in the year, Hinckley attempted to overdose on Valium, prompting his parents to
arrange for him to meet a psychiatrist.10 The first two visits were positive, with
reports of Hinckley’s mood improving for the better.11 However, the psychiatrist
remained ignorant to Hinckley’s deep obsession with Foster and the violent inclinations simmering in his head. Consequently, Hinckley’s overall mental
health did not improve.12
On the morning of March 30, 1981, Hinckley put the letter to Foster in his
suitcase and left the luggage in his hotel room.13 The letter plainly stated Hinckley’s intention to “get” Reagan as a way to secure Foster’s affection.14 “As you
well know by now,” the letter read, “I love you very much. . . . I would abandon
this idea of getting Reagan in a second if I could only win your heart and live out
the rest of my life with you, whether it be in total obscurity or whatever.”15 To
1

JAMES W. CLARKE, ON BEING MAD OR MERELY ANGRY: JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR., AND OTHER
DANGEROUS PEOPLE 58–59 (1990).
2 Id.
3 See id. at 59.
4 Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States—Post-Hinckley, 11
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 54 (1987).
5 See CLARKE, supra note 1, at 15–16 (“The soft cushion of family affluence and the comfortable material life it assured suggested little to be bitter about.”).
6 Id. at 35.
7 Id. at 38.
8 Id. at 38–39.
9 Id. at 39.
10 Id. at 43.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 58.
13 Id. at 5–6, 58.
14 Id. at 58.
15 Id.
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“get” Reagan, Hinckley tracked down the President outside of a venue where
President Reagan had just finished giving a speech.16 Outside the lobby, as President Reagan approached his limousine, Hinckley fired six shots at the president
and his Secret Service security detail.17 Fortunately, his attempt on Reagan’s life
proved as unsuccessful as his courting of Jodie Foster.18 Hinckley was quickly
arrested, charged, and put on trial.19
It was clear that Hinckley suffered from mental illness.20 The issue was
whether Hinckley was legally insane, such that he could satisfy his plea of
NGRI.21 At the time, the test for insanity in federal courts allowed Hinckley to
be found legally insane if he “lack[ed] substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.”22 His defense presented testimony of three psychiatrists and one psychologist to paint a picture of, as lead counsel of the defense team stated, “a very sympathetic . . . young man who was friendless, had a terrible sense of hopelessness,
and was totally without the requisite mental capacity to appreciate . . . the wrongfulness of his conduct.”23 Ultimately, the jury determined Hinckley did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and returned a NGRI verdict.24 He was
subsequently transferred to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, a mental health facility,
where he stayed until his release in 2016.25
The public’s reaction to the verdict was unfavorable, to say the least, and
created a widespread call for tougher laws on the insanity defense.26 A poll administered after the verdict found that “76 percent of those questioned said

16

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
18 Id. at 10.
19 Douglas O. Linder, The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr., FAMOUS TRIALS, https://famoustrials.com/johnhinckley/537-home [https://perma.cc/UN7K-BW2D].
20 Vincent J. Fuller, United States v. John W. Hinckley Jr. (1982), 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699,
699 (2000). Vincent Fuller served as lead counsel for John Hinckley in the United States v.
Hinckley trial. Id.
21 Linder, supra note 19.
22 Fuller, supra note 20, at 699.
23 Id. at 701.
24 Linder, supra note 19.
25 Elizabeth Chuck, John Hinckley Freed from Mental Hospital 35 Years After Reagan Assassination Attempt, NBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2016, 8:46 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/john-hinckley-freed-mental-hospital-35-years-after-reagan-assassinationn646076 [https://perma.cc/FM5Z-EL5N]. Hinckley was released under court supervision and
was required to continue psychiatric treatment. Id. In September 2021, a federal judge approved Hinckley’s unconditional release starting in June of 2022, provided there are no new
concerns before that time. See Carrie Johnson, John Hinckley, Who Shot President Reagan,
Wins Unconditional Release, NPR (Sept. 27, 2021, 11:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/0
9/27/1040872498/john-hinckley-unconditional-release [https://perma.cc/783T-TXW3].
26 The Associated Press, Hinkley Acquittal Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1982, at 21.
17
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justice had not been done in the Hinckley case. ”27 Another study found that respondents felt the verdict was unfair and that Hinckley was not insane.28 In the
three years after Hinckley’s verdict, there was a considerable increase in reforms
to the insanity defense—with twenty-five states making such changes.29 A common legislative reform by the states was the creation of the “guilty but mentally
ill” (GBMI) verdict.30 The idea behind GBMI was to provide an alternative to
the insanity defense—allowing juries to recognize a defendant’s mental illness
while still assigning legal culpability.31 In theory, a defendant found guilty but
mentally ill would be convicted and incarcerated, rather than institutionalized,
and still receive mental health treatment.32
Interestingly, Nevada was not one of the states to make changes to the insanity defense within the aforementioned study period.33 Nevada did not propose
any changes to the insanity defense until 1995, though the legislature referenced
the Hinckley verdict as an example of why such reform was needed.34 A1995 bill
began a turbulent cycle of differing law regarding insanity defense in Nevada
that ultimately stagnated in 2007.35 Today, through various court cases and statute revisions, Nevada seems to have settled on allowing both the not guilty by
reason of insanity defense and the guilty but mentally ill verdict.36
This Note argues that the two verdicts cannot coexist as they currently do in
Nevada. The issue lies in how the courts will differentiate between a mental illness that rises to the standard of legal insanity and mental illness that does not
reach that same standard. While a NGRI verdict ends with a defendant in a mental health facility, both a guilty verdict and a guilty but mentally ill verdict place
the defendant in prison. This Note argues the redundancy between the two guilty
verdicts must render one of them superfluous—particularly in a state like Nevada
that allows acquittal by insanity. Part I will provide a brief history and background on the insanity defense throughout the country. Part II will summarize
Nevada’s own tumultuous history with the insanity defense statute and how the
current system works. Finally, Part III will argue that the guilty but mentally ill
27

Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public’s
Verdict, 47 PUB. OP. Q. 202, 202 (1983) (quoting ABC News Nightline: Insanity Plea on Trial
(ABC television broadcast June 22, 1982)).
28 Id.
29 Callahan et al., supra note 4, at 54–55.
30 Id. at 55. See also Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose
Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 495 (1985).
31 Slobogin, supra note 30, at 495.
32 Id.
33 Callahan et al., supra note 4, at 56 tbl.1.
34 Minutes of the S. Comm. on Judiciary April 4, 1995, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. (Nev. 1995)
[hereinafter April 4 Minutes]. (The transcript of the committee meeting correctly identifies
Hinckley as the attempted assassin of President Reagan, but incorrectly spells his last name as
“Hinkley.”)
35 Minutes of the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary March 20, 2007, 2007 Leg., 74th Sess., at 6,
27 (Nev. 2007) [hereinafter March 20 Minutes].
36 Id. at 6, 8.
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verdict should not have been readopted by the Nevada legislature and also explore more equitable, if any, reforms for those who commit crime and live with
mental illness.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE

A. The Man, the Test, the Legacy—the Origins of the M’Naghten Test
The legal concept of insanity is rooted in the recognition that individuals
with certain mental capacities may not understand when their conduct violates
societal legal or moral standards.37 Most crimes, either established by statute or
common law, consist of a mental component in addition to the criminal act itself.38 This mental component, or mens rea, generally requires a criminal intent,
which must be proven as a material element of the offense.39 Thus, legal insanity
happens when a person cannot form such criminal intent.40
The majority of the states, including Nevada, test legal insanity using a
standard created by an English trial from 1843.41 Daniel M’Naghten (sometimes
spelled “M’Naughton”42 or “McNaughton”43) suffered from paranoid delusions
that caused him to believe the British Prime Minister and other high-ranking
members of the British government were conspiring to kill him.44 In an attempt
to neutralize the perceived threat, M’Naghten traveled to London intending to
assassinate Prime Minister Robert Peel by shooting into his carriage.45 However,
in a stroke of luck, Peel inexplicably rode in the Queen’s carriage that day.46
When M’Naghten shot into the Prime Minister’s carriage, he killed Peel’s secretary instead.47
The criminal trial would focus on M’Naghten’s delusions and the
right/wrong test for insanity.48 M’Naghten was ultimately found not guilty, on
this ground of insanity.49 As with United States v. Hinckley, the case’s spiritual
successor over a century later, the verdict was met with public disapproval and
calls for change.50 As a result, the common-law court judges were brought before
37

Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 71 (Nev. 2001).
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Rudolph J. Gerber, The Insanity Defense Revisited, 1984 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 83, 84 (1984).
42 RICHARD BOUSFIELD & RICHARD MERRETT, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF DANIEL M’NAUGHTON
(1843).
43 April 4 Minutes, supra note 34.
44 Gerber, supra note 41, at 84.
45 Id. at 84–85.
46 Id. at 85.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 86.
50 Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 72, 74 (Nev. 2001).
38
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Queen Victoria and the House of Lords to discuss and amend the concept of legal
insanity.51 Collectively, the judges established new criteria for jurors to determine if a defendant could be eligible for an insanity defense, provided a defendant could prove that
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.52

Thus, the M’Naghten test was born.53 The test, sometimes referred to as the
M’Naghten Rule, allows for a defendant to be acquitted by reasons of insanity if
a defendant’s mental illness impeded him or her from understanding the nature
of his or her actions, or if it prevented him or her from knowing his or her action
is wrong.54 Ironically, using the test that bears his name, the common-law judges
determined that M’Naghten should not have been found legally insane.55 It was
clear that he understood his actions—evident by the fact that he prepared a trip
from his home in Scotland for the planned assassination.56 Additionally, his paranoid delusions of persecution did not legally or morally justify the killing and
did not prevent him from knowing his actions were morally or legally wrong.57
This concept of a strict uniform rule to determine insanity spread to other
British courts and across the sea to the United States, which quickly embraced
the standard.58 In 1851, the test was adopted by the federal court system and the
majority of the state courts had followed suit.59 The M’Naghten test remained
the predominate test for insanity up until the early 1960s.60 However, unsurprisingly, several scholars felt that a test conceived in the nineteenth century was not
consistent with advances in society, medicine, and psychology.61 New discoveries and accepted theories of psychology highlighted the M’Naghten test’s deficiencies, which in turn created a need for revision of the legal test for insanity.62

51

Id. at 72. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719.
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep.. at 722.
53 Gerber, supra note 41, at 89.
54 Finger, 27 P.3d at 72.
55 Id. at 73.
56 See id. at 72–73.
57 See id.
58 Kenneth J. Weiss & Neha Gupta, America’s First M’Naghten Defense and the Origin of
the Black Rage Syndrome, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 503, 503 (2018).
59 Kimberly Collins et al., The Hinckley Trial’s Effect on the Insanity Defense, FAMOUS
TRIALS, https://famous-trials.com/johnhinckley/540-insanity [perma.cc/W3ZE-SMHG].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 73 (Nev. 2001).
52
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B. Criticism and Alternative Tests of Legal Insanity
Because insanity is a legal term, not a medical term, there is a distinct fissure
between law and medicine when it comes to the insanity defense. A psychologist
or psychiatrist called to testify on a defendant’s sanity must translate a medical
diagnosis of mental illness to a judgment on a defendant’s ability to know “right
and wrong.”63 This problem is bolstered by the lack of definitions of the terms
for which doctors are to make their judgments.64 “Disease of the mind,” “know,”
and “wrong” are all undefined by the test, leaving it up to the individual courts
to determine their meaning.65 It then falls on the psychologist or psychiatrist
called before the court to discern how a defendant’s mental illness relates to these
definitions and how it affected a defendant’s perception of right and wrong.66 As
a result, American psychiatrists and psychologists have expressed widespread
dissatisfaction for the M’Naghten test.67
Another common criticism of the M’Naghten test is its basis in an obsolete
theory.68 Its emphasis on a defendant’s cognitive capacity to understand the nature of his crime is a product of the time’s leading psychological theories.69 If an
individual could differentiate right from wrong, the belief of the time was that he
should be able to make rational decisions based on that judgment.70 Essentially,
sanity and insanity are based only on one’s “ability to appreciate, know, or distinguish right from wrong.”71 The test requires an all-or-nothing approach to a
defendant’s cognitive capacity—a theory that has largely been rejected by modern psychology.72 Currently, the commonly accepted psychological theory is that
the mind and personality are integrated in a combination of cognitive capacity,
volition, impulse, the subconscious, and the environment.73 A person may know
the act is wrong through his or her cognitive capacity, but still commit it as a
result of mental illness affecting another aspect of his or her personality.74

63

Gerber, supra note 41, at 89.
Id. at 93.
65 Id.; see also R. Michael Shoptaw, Comment, M’Naghten is a Fundamental Right: Why
Abolishing the Traditional Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 84 MISS. L.J. 1101, 1109
(2015).
66 Gerber, supra note 41, at 89.
67 Dale E. Bennett, The Insanity Defense—a Perplexing Problem of Criminal Justice, 16 LA.
L. REV. 484, 485 (1956).
68 See Gerber, supra note 41, at 92.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Henry T. Miller, Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46 LA. L. REV. 337, 342 (1985).
72 See Gerber, supra note 41, at 92.
73 Id.
74 Beatrice R. Maidman, The Legal Insanity Defense: Transforming the Legal Theory into a
Medical Standard, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2016).
64
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1. Broadening and Narrowing the Standard for Insanity
To address these shortcomings, courts and legal organizations began to formulate new standards for insanity.75 One standard, often used in tandem with the
M’Naghten test, is the irresistible impulse test.76 A way to recognize the aforementioned integrated mind and personality, the irresistible impulse test reconciles the idea that someone may know their action is wrong but is unable to stop
themselves from acting because of their mental illness.77 A defendant is legally
insane if his or her mental illness causes a need to commit the illegal act, and he
or she then acts on that need.78 A common way of explaining this is the “policeman at the elbow” test, in which a defendant is legally insane if he or she would
have committed the same illegal act even if there was a police officer grabbing
his or her elbow.79
In 1954, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia expanded
the test for insanity.80 In the case of Durham v. United States, the court decided
that a person could not be held legally responsible for actions that are a direct
result of his or her mental illness.81 In Durham, the defendant was convicted of
breaking into a house.82 Because of his extensive mental health history, as well
as other evidence presented at the trial, the court found that, if not for his mental
illness, he would not have attempted the break in.83 For a defendant to be found
insane under the Durham test, the defendant had to both have a mental illness
and the illness had to be the cause of his or her illegal act.84 Unlike its predecessors, the test did not require an assessment of a defendant’s knowledge of right
or wrong in relation to the criminal act.85 This test had its own share of criticism,
mostly for being too expansive,86 and the circuit court abandoned the test in
1972.87
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed its own test, combining
elements of M’Naghten, the irresistible impulse test, and the Durham test.88 The
ALI test states that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time
the act was committed, the person’s mental illness caused him or her to not
75

See Miller, supra note 71, at 337–38.
Charles L. Cetti, Comment, M’Naghten Rule v. Irresistible Impulse Test, 14 MERCER L.
REV. 418, 419 (1963).
77 Id.
78 Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 73 (Nev. 2001).
79 Andrew Donohue et al., Legal Insanity: Assessment of the Inability to Refrain, 5
PSYCHIATRY 58, 61 (2008).
80 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 864.
83 See id. at 866–69.
84 See id. at 876.
85 Id.
86 Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 73 (Nev. 2001).
87 Collins et al., supra note 59.
88 Finger, 27 P.3d at 73–74.
76
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understand the criminality of the conduct.89 Unlike the M’Naghten test, a person
does not have to be completely incapacitated to be considered legally insane, but
still needs to experience a substantial impairment of mental capacity.90 Compare
this to the Durham test, which allowed for any amount of impairment caused by
a mental illness to qualify as insane.91 The ALI provided a happy middle ground
between the restrictive M’Naghten test and the liberal Durham test.92 In turn, the
ALI test took over as the preeminent test for insanity in the state and federal
courts.93
It was under the ALI test that the court acquitted John Hinckley Jr. by reasons of insanity in 1982.94 As previously explored, the Hinckley assassination
attempt on President Reagan and subsequent acquittal by reasons of insanity
thrust the insanity defense into the spotlight.95 The public was outraged that a
man caught on camera trying to kill the President would not spend the rest of his
life in prison.96 At the time, there was no authority for federal courts to civilly
commit a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity.97 The trial judge in Hinckley’s case used a District of Columbia statute to commit Hinckley to a mental
health facility, until a further hearing determined if he constituted a danger to
himself or to others.98 Hinckley then received the right to request a rehearing on
his mental status every six months.99 Hinckley remained in the same mental
health facility until 2016, when he was released under court supervision with the
requirement to continue psychiatric treatment.100
89

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 2020) (Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility).
90 Finger, 27 P.3d at 74.
91 Id.; see also Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–76 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
92 Finger, 27 P.3d at 74.
93 Collins et al., supra note 59.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Chuck, supra note 25.
97 CATHERINE MARION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 82-ID, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW
AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 2 (1982).
98 Id.
99 Laura A. Kiernan et al., Hinckley Found Not Guilty, Insane, WASH. POST (Jun. 22, 1982),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/06/22/hinckley-found-not-guilty-insane/939fafa6-9441-4579-bb04-39da0d287e2d [https://perma.cc/R6BS-6Q2T].
100 Chuck, supra note 25. Amazingly, Hinckley has seemingly found success, whether morbidly curious or otherwise, as a singer on YouTube. EJ Dickson, He Tried to Kill a President.
Then YouTube Made Money Off Him, ROLLING STONE (June 4, 2021, 3:37 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/john-hinckley-youtube-channel-monetization-1178214 [https://perma.cc/98UH-QY85]. The article incorrectly identifies Hinckley as
a “convicted presidential assassin.” Id. However, as already stated, Hinckley was acquitted of
the crime and was also unsuccessful in his assassination attempt at the time, though one of the
victims of the shooting, Press Secretary James Brady, was critically injured and had to use a
wheelchair up until his death in 2014, which was ruled as a homicide. Bill Chappell, James
Brady’s Death Is Ruled a Homicide, NPR (Aug. 8, 2014, 6:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/08/08/338949267/james-brady-s-death-is-ruled-a-homicide
[https://perma.cc/9P9R-R4PP]. Hinckley’s newfound internet presence is the result of a
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Following Hinckley’s acquittal by reason of insanity and the accompanying
public outcry, Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA)
in an effort placate the critics.101 Congressional testimony conceded that “much
of the concern was prompted by many popular myths about the defense,” but
Congress felt there was the need for reform “in order to restore public confidence
in the criminal justice system.”102 The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice and the
Judiciary Committee called the ALI’s broadness into question, specifically the
volitional prong of the test.103 Some of the significant provisions of the IDRA
included, in addition to removing the volitional prong, eliminating the defense
of diminished capacity and creating the specific verdict of “not guilty only by
reason of insanity.”104 It also rectified the insanity defense’s sentencing limbo by
requiring federal commitment of those found NGRI.105 Additionally, the Act
placed the burden of proof on the defendant to establish insanity by clear and
convincing evidence.106
The proposed reform of the insanity verdict did not end there. Separate from
the federal law, the states each have their own legislation for state crimes.107
States reassessed their own legislation surrounding the insanity defense, with
many adopting similar commitment requirements to the federal system.108 Another popular, though misguided, solution some states have adopted is that of the
“guilty but mentally ill” verdict.109

lawsuit in which a judge allowed Hinckley to publicly display his art, including his writing,
paintings, and music. Michael Levenson, John Hinckley Can Publicly Display His Artwork,
Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/29/us/johnhinckley-art.html [https://perma.cc/HDA6-2H8X]. However, any royalties or profits Hinckley
receives from his art must comply with the terms of several civil suits from victims of the
shooting. See id.
101 Michelle R. Prejean, Comment, “Texas Law Made This Mad Woman Sane,” 42 HOUS. L.
REV. 1487, 1494–96 (2006).
102 130 CONG. REC. 25840 (1984) (statement of John Conyers Jr., Mich. Rep.).
103 Id.
104 Criminal Resource Manual § 634: Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-634-insanity
-defense-reform-act-1984 [https://perma.cc/DPE2-JQVQ] (Jan. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Criminal Resource Manual].
105 Id.
106 Id. Interestingly, the IDRA actually lowered the evidentiary standard for a finding of insanity from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing evidence. Finger v. State, 27
P.3d 66, 74 (Nev. 2001).
107 Comparing Federal & State Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure/comparing-federal-state-courts [https://perma.cc/4VQRKL6Q].
108 Callahan et al., supra note 4, at 55.
109 Id. at 54–55.
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2. Guilty but Mentally Ill—a New, but Not Improved, Insanity Verdict
While the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict failed at the federal level,
it thrived in various state legislatures.110 The verdict emanated from the public’s
perceived necessity to reduce the amount of acquittals by reason of insanity.111
The alleged abuse of the insanity defense symbolized the loss of social control
and the failure of law and order as a whole.112 As a middle ground between a
NGRI acquittal and a straight guilty verdict, the GBMI verdict allowed the courts
to find a defendant guilty, therefore committing him or her to some form of criminal punishment, while also acknowledging and treating the mental illness of the
defendant.113 A defendant could be found GBMI if a fact-finder finds the defendant was (1) guilty of the crime, (2) mentally ill at the time of the crime, and (3)
not legally insane at the time of the crime.114 Someone who is convicted under a
GBMI verdict would be eligible for mental health treatment while in prison. 115
Ideally, the GBMI verdict would give comfort to the public because someone
who committed a crime would still be subject to punishment that included separation from the general population.
The verdict itself precedes the Hinckley trial by almost ten years—Michigan
enacted the first GBMI statute in 1975.116 However, Hinckley’s acquittal certainly helped in increasing the verdict’s popularity.117 By 1985, eleven states had
enacted GBMI verdicts, either during the Hinckley trial or in the years following
his acquittal.118 Furthermore, several other states proposed or planned to introduce a GBMI statute.119 Advocates for the verdict stated, “[I]t’s a necessary tool
that ensures that people who commit horrible crimes will be made to pay the
consequences.”120
110

Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME:
FINAL REPORT 54 (1981) [hereinafter TASK FORCE], and 18 U.S.C. § 17, with Callahan et al.,
supra note 4, at 55.
111 Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty but Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. REV.
601, 615 (1985).
112 Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity
Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5, 9 (1996).
113 Note, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process, 92 YALE L.J. 475, 475 (1983).
114 Id. at 476.
115 Slobogin, supra note 30, at 495.
116 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (2014).
117 See Slobogin, supra note 30, at 498 n.20 (“According to a survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts, Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah adopted the
guilty but mentally ill verdict partly because of the outrage over the Hinckley verdict.” (citations omitted)).
118 Callahan et al., supra note 4, at 56 tbl.1.
119 The Associated Press, supra note 26, at 21 (“Legislation to abolish the insanity defense or
create the ‘guilty but insane’ alternative has been proposed or will be introduced in Alabama,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.”).
120 Janan Hanna, ‘Guilty but Mentally Ill’ Verdict Upheld by Court, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 23,
1999), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1999-04-23-9904230166-story.html [h
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The GBMI verdict is not without its faults and seemingly exists only as a
way to placate public outrage. The deficiencies in the verdict will be explored
later in this Note. Specifically, as seen in Nevada, the flawed nature of having
both the GBMI verdict and the NGRI acquittal.
II. NEVADA’S TURBULENT INSANITY DEFENSE HISTORY
A. Abolition and Reinstatement of the Insanity Defense
As mentioned above, Nevada would not propose reform to the state’s insanity defense statute until more than ten years after Reagan’s assassination attempt.121 Nevada has historically used the M’Naghten rule to determine what
constitutes legal insanity,122 as well as the M’Naghten guideline for evaluating
delusions.123 A defendant was required to establish his or her insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.124 If there was a NGRI acquittal, the defendant
would be committed to a mental health facility and would only be released when
a judge determined he or she was no longer mentally ill and not a danger to
themselves or others.125 Nevada’s laws of legal insanity conformed to the standard set of legal insanity rules under the M’Naghten test and adhered to a narrow
view of the defense.126
In 1995, the Nevada Legislature considered several amendments that would
abolish the criminal defense of insanity altogether.127 Reform was necessary, one
senator argued, because of “a prevalent perception that the criminal justice system does not effectively hold people responsible for their conduct.”128 The legislature enacted Senate Bill 314 (SB 314) which abolished the insanity defense
and replaced it with the GBMI plea.129
At the time, like most states, use of the insanity defense in Nevada was
rare.130 One proponent of abolishing the defense testified that in his twenty years
of experience as a judge, he could only remember one case raising the insanity
ttps://perma.cc/FDX8-HHPM].
121 April 4 Minutes, supra note 34.
122 See Williams v. State, 451 P.2d 848, 851 (Nev. 1969) (holding “M’Naghten’s rule is the
proper test”).
123 See State v. Lewis, 22 P. 241, 252 (Nev. 1889) (finding if the reasoning behind the act
would have been justified had those facts actually existed, then the act is not criminal because
of the person’s insanity).
124 See Gallegos v. State, 446 P.2d 656, 657 (Nev. 1968) (holding the trial court’s use of the
preponderance of the evidence standard to prove insanity was proper).
125 See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 76 (Nev. 2001) (discussing former NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 175.521 (1994)).
126 Id.
127 April 4 Minutes, supra note 34.
128 Id.
129 See id. (quoting a senator’s suggestion of the usefulness of “consider[ing] an allowance
for guilty but insane”).
130 Id.
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defense.131 The judge emphasized the cost associated with the singular case,
mostly due to the cost of expert witnesses to diagnose the defendant raising insanity.132 Though SB 314 was passed and signed into law, it was not without its
critics.133 A Washoe County public defender testified during the Senate hearing
that the bill “thr[ew] out the baby with the bath water” and that “[d]enying a
person the opportunity to offer a defense which calls attention to medical and
scientific facts now accepted denies due process rights.”134
Still, the insanity defense was abolished in Nevada, and the term insanity
was deleted from the statutes that defined criminal culpability and defenses.135
Insanity as it related to liability was now only found in Section 193.220 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes, which stated, “No act committed by a person while in
a state of insanity or voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but . . . the fact of his insanity or intoxication may be taken
into consideration in determining the purpose, motive or intent.”136 The insanity
defense did not become a true controversy again until the case of Finger v. State,
with NRS 193.220 being a central issue to the case.137
In 1996, Frederick Finger was accused of murdering his mother by stabbing
her in the head with a kitchen knife.138 Finger had an extensive history of mental
illness, dating back to 1972 when he was diagnosed with “schizophrenia, manic
depressive disorder with homicidal and suicidal tendencies, intermittent explosive disorder and paranoia.”139 Finger also suffered from hallucinations and had
been institutionalized several times prior.140 The district court denied his request
to enter a plea of NGRI, subsequent to the abolition of the plea the year prior.141
Originally, he declined to enter any plea after his NGRI plea was denied, causing
the district court to enter a not guilty plea for him and to set a date for trial.142 He
then decided “there were no issues to be resolved by a trial,” and pleaded GBMI
to a lesser charge of second-degree murder to raise the constitutional argument
on the insanity defense through an appeal.143
In Finger’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada, he alleged that the abolition of the insanity defense violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution, as well as Sections 6 and 8(5) of Article 1 of the Nevada

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
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143

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 70–71 (Nev. 2001).
Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted) (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220 (2001)).
Id at 68, 71.
Id. at 68.
Id at 69.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
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Constitution.144 He additionally argued that the use of the term “insanity” in NRS
193.220, combined with the elimination of the insanity defense, “permits persons
to be convicted of crimes even though they did not possess the mental ability to
form the criminal intent designated as an element of an offense.”145 The statute
was apparent in its contradictions—it recognized that insanity can be used to
determine whether or not an element of a crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt yet also stated that someone cannot be acquitted as a result of that
insanity.146
The State argued that NRS 193.220 allowed a defendant “to introduce evidence regarding insanity as it relates to the ability of the defendant to form intent.”147 Though insanity could not be raised as an affirmative defense, it could
show that an individual lacked the required intent to commit the crime and therefore could not be convicted.148 The Court determined that the State’s interpretation of this mens rea model was incorrect.149 Knowledge that an action is
“wrong” is generally not an element of a crime, even if the crime requires specific
intent.150 The mens rea model only requires a culpable state of mind regarding
the crime itself, not regarding whether the act is illegal or wrong.151
The Court also found that the basis for the amendment abolishing the insanity defense was likely the result of confusing case law and inaccurate explanations of what constituted legal insanity in Nevada.152 It appeared that juries and
expert witnesses were not instructed on the delusional analysis of M’Naghten;
instead, they were only given the basic rule.153 This contributed to confusion surrounding the standard for insanity, as “the Legislature could not determine
whether the court had intended to expand M’Naghten informally without adopting some new test for legal insanity or if the court had simply improperly analyzed those cases . . . .”154 Proponents for the amendment did not provide specific
case names to illustrate the alleged abuse of the insanity defense, instead using
anecdotes to make their point.155 Furthermore, the legal definitions of insanity
given at the hearing for the amendment were not those of the M’Naghten standard.156 By not discussing Nevada’s insanity defense using the standard set forth
in the M’Naghten test, and therefore not discussing the standard that would be
144

Id. at 68.
Id. at 71.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 79.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Mens Rea, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea [https
://perma.cc/C3TW-6WDF].
152 See Finger, 27 P.3d at 77.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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used at trial, it was difficult for the legislature to get an accurate depiction of
Nevada’s insanity laws.157
Additionally, the Court found that “due process requires that a defendant be
able to present evidence and argue that he or she lacked the mens rea to commit
the criminal act.”158 The Court noted that criminal intent is so integral to American criminal law, the public outrage of the Hinckley acquittal was not enough
to persuade Congress to abolish the insanity defense at the federal level.159 Using
the doctrine of historic practice, the Court analyzed whether legal insanity was a
fundamental principle under the Due Process Clause. The Court determined that
the concept of mens rea and the insanity defense were too interconnected to have
one without the other—because the prosecution must prove the mens rea of the
crime, it stands to reason that there also exists a concept that negates the mens
rea.160 Legal insanity itself, the Court concluded, is a fundamental principle under the Due Process Clause.161 Therefore, it was unconstitutional for the lLegislature to abolish insanity as a complete defense.162
Finally, the Court examined if the GBMI plea created by SB 314 should
remain intact.163 Based on Nevada case law, an entire law should be invalidated
when “provisions of an act cannot be severed without defeating the whole scope
and object of the law.”164 The GBMI plea broadened the scope of legal insanity
when read in conjunction with the language of NRS 193.200, in direct contradiction with the purpose of the law.165 The Court concluded that the entire Act
should be rejected and all statutes that were modified by SB 314 should be converted to the prior versions.166 Thus, the GBMI plea was no more.
With the repeal of SB 314, the Court stated Finger was entitled to withdraw
his plea of guilty but mentally ill and enter a plea of insanity.167 The broader
repercussions of Finger changed the landscape of the insanity defense in Nevada.
It established legal insanity as a constitutional right under both the U.S. and Nevada State Constitution, forbidding the legislature from abolishing the defense.168
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Given Nevada’s biennial legislative session,169 the NGRI verdict was not
added back into law until 2003.170 The bill passed with little fanfare, though the
insanity defense’s notoriously confusing definition and application were still at
issue during the Judiciary Committee’s meeting.171 Several assembly members
questioned the placement and evaluation of a person found not guilty by reason
of insanity.172 Ben Graham, of the Nevada District Attorney’s Association, remarked, “[T]his deals strictly with the [use of the] M’Naghten Rule for defense
at criminal trials. What we do with these souls afterwards, I think the medical
people take over from there.”173
B. The Return of the Guilty but Mentally Ill Plea
A few months after the Nevada Supreme Court decided the insanity defense’s fate, a separate murder case transpired that would bring the GBMI verdict
back to the forefront. In October 2001, Michael Kane stabbed John Trowbridge
several times, killing him.174 Kane was under the influence of LSD at the time of
the murder and was later diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic by the defense’s
psychologist.175 Kane was influenced by an insane delusion that he was under
attack, causing him to use his knife in a perceived act of self-defense.176 Kane’s
psychological troubles continued past his arrest, prompting a brief stint in a psychiatric hospital while awaiting trial.177 Over the next couple of years, Kane’s
inconsistent medication use caused his behavior to waver between violently delusional and mentally competent enough to stand trial.178 Kane faced trial for
first-degree murder in 2004, where he pleaded NGRI.179 Both the prosecution
and the defense agreed Kane suffered from genuine mental illness.180 Kane’s attorney stated, “The [insanity] defense doesn’t mean anything if you can’t use it
in cases like this.”181 Kane’s case ended up being the first real test of the holding
169

LEGIS. COUNS. BUREAU, THE 2021–2022 GUIDE TO THE NEVADA LEGISLATURE 20 (23d ed.
2021) (explaining that the Nevada Legislature meets biennially on the odd-numbered year).
170 NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (2003).
171 Minutes of the Assembl. Comm. on Judiciary April 9, 2003, 2003 Leg., 72d Sess. (Nev.
2003).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Matt Pordum, Insanity Defense Accepted; Kane Acquitted of Murder, LAS VEGAS SUN
(Sept. 15, 2004, 9:39 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2004/sep/15/insanity-defense-accepted-kane-acquitted-of-murder [https://perma.cc/JA2A-GEK7].
175 Stephanie Simon, A Killer’s Insanity, Cured, L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2005, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-jul-31-na-insanity31-story.html
[https://perma.cc/RMJ5-GA3E].
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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of Finger and the reinstated insanity laws.182 It also epitomized several common
themes with the public perception of the insanity defense: specifically, a misunderstanding of the law, combined with the dissonance between the legal meaning
of insanity and its normal usage, and a call for reform to the defense as a whole.
1. A “Mentally Ill Person” Versus a Person with a “Mental Illness”
Kane was acquitted by reason of insanity,183 and his acquittal meant the court
had ninety days to determine if there was clear and convincing evidence that he
was mentally ill.184 It was Nevada’s first acquittal due to insanity in almost a
decade.185 If found mentally ill, the court would order Kane’s commitment to the
custody of the Administrator of the Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services.186 Kane was sent to Lake’s Crossing, a maximum-security psychiatric facility in Sparks, Nevada.187 While there, the state evaluated him every six
months188 to determine if he had recovered from his mental illness or improved
to the point he could no longer be considered a “mentally ill person.”189
Ten months after Kane’s acquittal by reason of insanity, the practitioners at
Lake’s Crossing determined Kane was no longer a mentally ill person.190 As a
result, the state would begin the process to determine if Kane should be released
back into society, starting with a competency hearing.191 The presiding judge,
District Judge Jennifer Togliatti, ruled the Lake’s Crossing practitioners must
review the expert psychological testimony from Kane’s trial and then reevaluate
him to see if they reach the same conclusion.192 Kane’s release was subsequently
delayed for roughly four years.193

182

See Pordum, supra note 174.
Id.
184 NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.539(2) (2021).
185 GLENN PUIT, WITCH: THE TRUE STORY OF LAS VEGAS’S MOST NOTORIOUS FEMALE KILLER
295–96 (2005).
186 § 175.539(2).
187 Lake’s Crossing Center for Mentally Disordered Offenders Overview, DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. NEV. DIV. PUB. & BEHAV. HEALTH (May 28, 2015), http://dpbh.nv.gov/About/
Overview/Lake_s_Crossing_Center_Overview [https://perma.cc/U67E-GZCQ].
188 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.450(2) (2003) (providing that reports must be submitted “at 6month intervals” for non-misdemeanors).
189 See id. § 175.539 (describing evaluation standard).
190 Matt Pordum, Doctors Say Man Acquitted of Murder No Longer Mentally Ill, LAS VEGAS
SUN (June 21, 2005, 11:08 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2005/jun/21/doctors-say-manacquitted-of-murder-no-longer-ment [https://perma.cc/M2AK-3FBG].
191 Minutes for Evidentiary Hearing, State v. Kane, No. 02C182563 (Clark Cnty. D. Ct. filed
Mar. 26, 2002).
192 Id.
193 See David Kihara, Man Who Killed in ’01 To Be Freed from Facility, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Mar. 20, 2008, 9:00 PM), https:// reviewjournal.com/news/man-who-killed-in-01-to-be-free
d-from-facility [https://perma.cc/GN9K-D7DT] (explaining that the stabbing occurred in 2001
and Kane’s verdict occurred in 2004).
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The idea that a killer could walk free stirred up controversy, despite its gross
oversimplification of Kane’s situation. This was evident in the news media covering the case. An LA Times article titled, “A Killer’s Insanity, Cured” supplied
almost sarcastic commentary, stating, “[Kane] jumped a friend without provocation and stabbed him. The jury found Kane not guilty by reason of insanity; he
was sent to a psychiatric hospital. There he made a remarkable recovery.”194 The
article went on to ask, “[Should] a fleeting diagnosis of insanity . . . be enough
to keep a killer out of prison[?]”195 The Las Vegas Sun, a local newspaper, ran
an article regarding Kane’s then-upcoming competency hearing with the headline, “Doctors Say Man Acquitted of Murder No Longer Mentally Ill.”196 None
of these statements are technically incorrect. However, they all lack the nuance
necessary when examining a complex defense like that of insanity. NGRI is
rooted in abstract and often confusing legal concepts that require careful examination and use of language.
Much of this conflict stems from the differences between words as defined
by statute and how those same words are used in everyday vernacular. Consider
the term “mentally ill person.” The law at the time of Kane’s case defined “mentally ill person” as
any person whose capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the
conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his personal needs is diminished, as a result of a mental illness, to the extent that he presents a clear and
present danger of harm to himself or others.197

Merriam-Webster, on the other hand, does not have a definition for the term
“mentally ill person.” The closest term is “mental illness,” which is defined as
“any of a broad range of medical conditions . . . that are marked primarily by
sufficient disorganization of personality, mind, or emotions to impair normal
psychological functioning and cause marked distress or disability . . . .”198
The key difference between the two definitions is the person presenting a
clear and present danger of harm to themselves or others. Under the law at the
time, a person could still have a diagnosable mental illness, but not be considered
a “mentally ill person,” if they did not present such a danger. However, the nonlegal use of mentally ill does not usually carry such a connotation. Instead, a
“mentally ill person” commonly refers to a person with any mental illness. As a
result, the report that Kane was no longer considered a “mentally ill person” under the definition of the law transformed into a scenario where Kane was no
longer mentally ill at all. Using these terms interchangeably was not just limited
to news reports. Kane’s attorney, Deputy Public Defender Scott Coffee, was
194

Simon, supra note 175 (emphasis added).
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196 Pordum, supra note 190.
197 NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.115(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 (End) of the 33d Special
Session (2021)) (emphasis added).
198 Mental Illness, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mental%20illness [https://perma.cc/BV9P-PNZH].
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quoted saying that Kane was “not mentally ill and at this point it’s safe for him
to return to society . . . .”199
Conflating the two definitions reinforces the idea that mental illness for the
purpose of insanity is a temporary or “fleeting”200 condition—something that a
person could be cured of after a short stint in a mental hospital. This idea is in
stark contrast to the medically accepted idea that mental illnesses cannot be
cured, only treated and managed.201 Assigning the notion of impermanence to
mental illness for the purpose of an insanity plea can also bolster the impression
that it can and will be faked. In Kane’s case, one of the detectives handling his
case said in a news article that “[t]here’s nothing wrong with this kid . . . . His
next stop should be Hollywood.”202
2. More Calls for Reform
Kane’s potential release also jumpstarted a campaign to reform the legislation surrounding the insanity defense, led by the victim’s mother, Robbin Trowbridge-Benko.203 At the time of her campaign, Kane’s future in psychiatric care
was still undetermined.204 However, Trowbridge-Benko’s objection to his release largely stemmed from the lack of aftercare for those found NGRI.205 She
criticized the Nevada Legislature, stating that when it reinstated the NGRI plea,
it did not consider the possibility that a person who was acquitted due to insanity
would make a recovery and be released without further monitoring.206
Eventually, Trowbridge-Benko obtained an audience with the legislature’s
Subcommittee to Study Sentencing and Pardons, Parole and Probation.207 Some
199

Pordum, supra note 190.
Simon, supra note 175.
201 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, CURRICULUM SUPP. SER. NBK20369, INFORMATION ABOUT
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE BRAIN (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20369
[https://perma.cc/M7LV-FL7W]; Is Mental Illness Curable?, MENTAL HEALTH AM.,
https://screening.mhanational.org/content/mental-illness-curable [https://perma.cc/W57D-3D
2P]; Mental Illness, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mentalillness/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20374974 [https://perma.cc/6XJK-HN7K]; see Frequently
Asked Questions, NAT’L ALL. MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/FAQ/General-Inform
ation-FAQ/Can-people-recover-from-mental-illness-Is-there-a [perma.cc/BJ69-YHFR] (discussing illness management and relief).
202 Simon, supra note 175.
203 Matt Pordum, Mother of 23-year-old Man Killed by Kane Calls on Lawmakers, LAS VEGAS
SUN, (Aug. 8, 2005, 9:27 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2005/aug/08/mother-of-23year-old-man-killed-by-kane-calls-on-/ [https://perma.cc/39QY-8W5C].
204 Id.
205 Pordum, supra note 190 (“ ‘Either the doctors were wrong then or now,’ TrowbridgeBenko said. ‘Someone was wrong and that decision might put a murdering thug back on the
street, without a record. He’ll be on the same playing field as you and me.’ ”).
206 See id. (discussing Trowbridge-Benko’s “suggestions as to how the law could be
changed”).
207 SUMMARY MINUTES & ACTION REP. BEFORE THE NEV. LEG. SUBCOMM. TO STUDY SENT’G
& PARDONS, & PAROLE & PROB., 2005 A.C.R., 73d Interim Sess. (Nev. 2005).
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of her proposed reform included monitored release, mandatory risk assessment,
and lifetime court jurisdiction of those found NGRI.208 At the time, Nevada was
the only state where a person would not have to enter a monitored release program after release from psychiatric care following a NGRI acquittal.209 Kane’s
trial attorney also acknowledged the potential benefit of a monitored release program and risk assessment.210 Kane’s case made it likely a proposal of reinstating
the guilty but mentally ill plea would be among the testimony presented at the
Subcommittee’s hearing.211
In 2007, the Assembly Committee on Judiciary met to discuss the new Assembly Bill (A.B.) 193 that would reinstate the GBMI verdict.212 After testimony
from the Nevada District Attorneys Association, the Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and the American Civil Liberties Union,213 the Assembly Committee
on Judiciary proposed an amended bill, which added:
[T]he language in the M’Naghten standard for not guilty by reason of insanity
[would] include a disease or defect of the mind rather than using the word “insanity” to define insanity. Another change made is that a plea of guilty but mentally
ill could only be taken up in trial upon a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Additionally, it requires that a defendant who is deemed mentally ill receive treatment from the Department of Corrections (NDOC).214

The amended bill passed unanimously through the Assembly and passed to
the Senate.215 The Senate amended A.B. 193 to include the language of another
bill, A.B. 369, which changed the standard of treatment for someone found
NGRI.216 The bill passed unanimously through the Senate as well217 and was
ultimately signed into law.218 A defendant is currently able to plead the following: not guilty, guilty, guilty but mentally ill.219 A defendant can also receive a
verdict of guilty but mentally ill, provided the defendant entered a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity.220 The addition of GBMI brought the conclusion of
an almost twelve-year journey. However, while this convoluted campaign was
arguably paved with good intentions, it was an attempt to fix a problem so rare
that it almost does not exist.
208
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III. INSANITY (WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?)
As explored above, Nevada is not unique in its quest to tame the controversial insanity defense. Eleven other states have adopted a version of the guilty but
mentally ill verdict.221 Back in 1981, the Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime stated that this verdict would ensure that the defendant who is incarcerated would receive treatment for their mental illness.222 On its face, the existence of the GBMI verdict fills the public safety gap purportedly left by the NGRI
verdict. Unfortunately, the GBMI verdict fails in concept and in practice, particularly as it exists alongside the well-established insanity defense.
The only meaningful result of having both verdicts is confusing the jury and
doing a disservice to the defendant. As such, the GBMI verdict should be eliminated. That is not to say the insanity defense is a perfect solution to handling
mentally ill offenders. However, the perception that the verdict of NGRI is a
“problem” that can only be fixed with radical reform is inaccurate.
A. An Unnecessary Coexistence
One of the fundamental principles of the American justice system is recognizing criminal behavior as punishable only if the act is blameworthy and lacking
justification.223 The purpose of a criminal trial is to make those determinations
of the defendant’s actions.224 Of course, the defendant’s mental state and/or illness assists with that determination.225
The GBMI verdict is an attempt to create a middle ground between acquittal
because of insanity and a guilty verdict of someone with a mental illness.226 The
verdict allows jurors to hold a defendant criminally culpable, while also acknowledging his or her mental illness.227 However, the verdict is rooted in a
221

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (1975); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-36-2-5 (West, Westlaw through the 2021 First Regular Session of the 122d General Assembly); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 Act No. 116); DEL. CODE ANN. 11, § 408 (West, Westlaw through ch. 266 of the
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through the end of the 2021 regular and special sessions); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-25-13
(West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Special Session); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2-6 (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 102-691 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. ); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(West,
Westlaw through legislation passed at the 2021 Regular and 1st Special Sessions of the Georgia General Assembly); 1953 UTAH LAWS § 77-16a-103 (2011).
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misunderstanding of an insanity acquittal.228 The central premise of the GBMI is
based on the idea that those who are found NGRI are let loose into the general
population, presumably to commit more heinous crimes.229 It may be understandable that the general public will have or has an uneasiness of designating a verdict
of not guilty to the man who attempted to kill the president—never mind the fact
that Hinckley spent more time civilly committed than not.230 Indeed, that is the
mindset that informed the decision to reinstate the verdict in Nevada.231 However, as mentioned above, the IDRA addressed this concern by requiring civil
commitment following a NGRI verdict.232 The commitment requirement was
also the most common reform of the insanity defense by states following the
Hinckley trial.233
Even still, the risk of recidivism by an acquittee found insane and then released is considerable, with some studies placing the number between six and
twenty percent.234 However, these numbers are less than or comparable to the
recidivism rates of all released felons.235 Those who are found NGRI and subsequently released are not measurably more dangerous than their convicted, noninsane peers.236 For those found GBMI, they are eligible for parole once their
minimum time has been served, depending on the perceived level of dangerousness.237 The unfortunate truth is recidivism can happen despite the criminal justice system’s best efforts. Predicting long-term dangers and the likelihood to
reoffend is a science that has not yet been perfected.238 Attempting to thwart any
crimes can really only be successful through lifelong incarceration or commitment, which goes against the model of the modern society.239
228
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Furthermore, a person found NGRI can serve mental health commitments
that can last nearly as long or longer than a prison sentence.240 The federal law
marks release not by a specific timeframe, but instead a vague measure of the
person’s likelihood to create “a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person
or serious damage of property of another due to a present mental disease or defect.”241 In a 1992 case, the Supreme Court held that a state “must establish insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence in order to confine
an insane convict.”242 Establishing insanity and dangerousness is therefore subject to a lower evidentiary standard than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
required to convict a defendant.243 In Nevada, the language of the insanity statute
presents a similar vague release standard that allows for confusion from the public.244
Another common talking point from champions of the GBMI verdict is the
view of a NGRI defense as an apparent “Get Out of Jail Free” card, allowing an
“insane” criminal to continue to wreak havoc on the general public.245 Again,
this appears to originate from a general misunderstanding of the verdict and the
punishment that comes with it.246 Defendants use the insanity defense at a remarkably rare rate, with most jurisdictions counting its use at less than one percent of all verdicts.247 Even when it is utilized, it is seldom successful.248
The publicity surrounding the cases utilizing the insanity defense makes the
defense seem much more common than the statistics report.249 These newsworthy cases lend themselves to sensationalized stories and tend to be of the type of
crime that shocks the public’s conscience. As such, the insanity defense pops up
in quite a few “household name” criminal cases. Andrea Yates, who was accused
of drowning her five children, was acquitted by reason of insanity on her appeal
240
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due to the jury finding that her mental illness caused her to think it was necessary
to kill her children in order to “save their souls from eternal damnation.”250 Jeffrey Dahmer attempted to plead insanity and, though his plea was ultimately unsuccessful, a Time magazine article speculated that if he were found insane he
could begin seeking release from a state mental hospital after only one year.251
James Holmes, who was responsible for twelve deaths in a Colorado movie theater, was allowed to raise an insanity defense, though the jury ultimately found
him guilty.252 In Nevada, the suspect in the fatal shooting of a Nevada Highway
Patrol sergeant intended to enter a plea of NGRI, though later entered a GBMI
plea.253
Additionally, it is important to note how the existence of both verdicts psychologically affects jurors. Several studies and research literature have indicated
that the inclusion of the GBMI option creates jury confusion. One study found
that only 4.2% of highly educated jurors could identify the definitions and consequences between NGRI and GBMI verdicts.254 As seen with the Kane murder
case in Nevada, it is difficult to inform people outside the legal community of
the difference between the definition of legal insanity, mental illness, and a mentally ill person.255
Potential jurors may end up misapplying the GBMI test, ultimately convicting someone who would have otherwise been acquitted by reasons of insanity.256
One study presented mock jurors with sixteen cases describing a mentally ill defendant with various mental disorders and varying levels of planning and bizarreness.257 In cases in which the defendant portrayed delusions and lack of planning,
250
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(2005)).
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ninety-five percent of the mock jurors returned with a verdict of NGRI.258 However, when presented with the option of GBMI, eighteen percent of mock jurors
returned with a verdict of NGRI for the exact same defendant.259 The majority of
mock jurors agreed that the GBMI was an adequate alternative for providing
treatment to mentally ill offenders.260 A similar study demonstrated comparable
results—mock NGRI verdicts decreased from sixty percent to thirty-five percent
when presented with the option of GBMI.261
However, the GBMI verdict can actually do a disservice to a mentally ill
defendant, despite the jurors’ good intentions. Studies examining the effect of
GBMI suggest that defendants convicted with a GBMI verdict receive longer
prison sentences than those who plead insanity but were found guilty.262 Interviews with Alaska’s Department of Corrections also indicated that no inmate
who was convicted under a GBMI verdict in Alaska has received parole.263
Moreover, there is an increasing264 amount265 of evidence266 that a GBMI verdict
does not affect the treatment provided to a mentally ill prisoner. In Nevada, when
the legislature reinstated the GBMI verdict, it did not allocate funding for additional mental health treatment.267 One study of GBMI inmates in Georgia found
that out of the 150 who had been convicted under that verdict, only three were
given care amounting to more than the existing provisions given to prisoners who
required inpatient care.268 Given that the promise of mental health treatment is
one of the main reasons juries favor GBMI verdicts, the lack of adequate treatment for these defendants renders the verdict purposeless.
Finally, mental health professionals and legal scholars generally disagree
with the adoption of the GBMI verdict.269 The American Psychiatric Association
stated that the GBMI verdict gives juries the “easy way out” by allowing them
“to avoid grappling with difficult issues of guilt and innocence . . . .”270 Leonard
S. Rubenstein, a lawyer and professor of practice at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
258
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School of Public Health, authored a scathing op-ed criticizing the verdict stating,
“It is as if Congress were to enact a law that permitted a verdict of ‘guilty but
from a deprived background’ or, for that matter, ‘guilty but short.’ ”271 Mental
Health America, a nonprofit dedicated to addressing the needs of those with mental illness, called the GBMI verdict “unjust, ineffective, and misleading.”272
“It is a truth [almost] universally acknowledged”273 by those in the medical
and legal industries that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is an unnecessary verdict with no discernible positive effect on the defendants it purports to assist. The
premise of the GBMI verdict is based on a misunderstanding of the complex
specifics required when analyzing criminal culpability. The “mentally ill” component of the verdict exists only to comfort both the public and juries. As noble
as the campaign for the GBMI verdict was in Nevada, it created a redundancy
and confusion at the expense of mentally ill offenders. However, there is room
for discussions on improving and reforming the NGRI plea.
B. Conditional Release as Informed Reform
Perhaps the greatest sin coming out of the attention surrounding the GBMI
verdict is how it distracts from meaningful discussion on how to reform the insanity defense. Indeed, even the conversation surrounding Nevada’s 2007 insanity defense and GBMI laws make only brief mention of the revised standards for
release for a defendant found NGRI.274 The revised Nevada Statute regarding
release removes the confusing language describing the defendant as a “mentally
ill person” and instead allows for
[d]ischarge from commitment if the person establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person would not be a danger, as a result of any mental disorder,
to himself or herself or to the person or property of another if discharged;
or . . . [c]onditional release from commitment if the person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person would not be a danger, as a result of
any mental disorder, to himself or herself or to the person or property of another
if released from commitment with conditions imposed by the court in consultation
with the Division.275

Conditional release programs have been successful in several states, allowing for the monitoring of individuals found NGRI with intervention prior to possible recidivism.276 A 1992 study found twenty-seven percent of California
271
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NGRI acquittees who were unconditionally released were rearrested, compared
to five percent of their conditionally released counterparts.277 Naturally, conditional release programs are also imperfect. The American Civil Liberties Union
of Nevada criticized the state’s current conditional release law, calling it unconstitutional.278 The organization argues that the state has no authority to continue
to hold and monitor a person who has been acquitted and found to not be a danger
to themselves or others.279 However, that is a separate argument from the one
presented in this Note.
In reality, many offenders who may have been found NGRI and might benefit from a conditional release program will never make it that far. The existence
of the GBMI verdict likely provides enough of a detour for attorneys and juries
to reroute the fate of such defendants. And while conditional release programs
hold their own issues, at least such programs are informed by a better understanding of the law and its effect on mentally ill offenders. In comparison, the
GBMI verdict, particularly in Nevada, appears to be a knee-jerk effort to deal
with the uncomfortable intersection of mental health and criminal acts.
CONCLUSION
The insanity defense has a long and complicated history at both the federal
and the state level. Nevada in particular has suffered from a capricious attitude
toward how to legally handle mentally ill offenders. However, the solution is not
to create a redundant and impractical verdict such as the GBMI verdict. Instead,
the focus should be on examining methods on how to improve the insanity defense as it currently exists, such as implementing conditional release programs
and improving services available to mentally ill offenders.
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